Using a large sample of US public debt issues we show that personal connections between directors of issuing companies and rating agencies result in higher credit ratings. We estimate the average effect to be between half a notch and one full notch.
Introduction
Our paper aims at answering two important questions: 1) are credit ratings affected by the presence of personal connections between directors of issuing companies and the rating agencies? and, 2) if so, do these connections exacerbate the conflict of interests or do they act as a better information channel between issuers and rating agencies?
Credit rating agencies (CRAs) play a crucial role in financial markets. The
Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 explicitly states that "Congress finds that credit rating agencies are of national importance …". The recent lawsuit by the US government against Standard and Poor's offers further testimony to the increasingly pivotal role CRAs play in financial markets.
1 Yet, despite their importance, little is known about how CRAs set their ratings. Our results therefore have potential important implications, as they shed more light on the factors that influence credit ratings.
CRAs operate under a constant dilemma. On the one hand, they are expected to provide impartial independent ratings. In fact, as noted by the Securities and Exchange On the other hand, personal connections may hinder the impartiality of CRAs and ultimately affect the quality of their ratings. Specifically, this could affect ratings in two ways. Firstly, the need of CRAs to maintain market share may create an incentive for them to cater to the interests of the issuers. For instance, Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2012) show that increased competition among CRAs increases the scope and incentive for companies to shop around for the best ratings. In an internal presentation enabling them to legally make use of private information [Jorion, Liu, and Shi, 2005; Butler and Cornaggia, 2012] . Personal connections could thus provide CRAs with access to 'soft information' that could reduce asymmetric information between the two parties. Further, as noted by Beaver, Shakespeare, and Soliman (2006) , CRAs have an asymmetric loss function, that is, the costs from losses due to overvaluation are weighted more than the forgone gains from an undervaluation. This could provide the incentive for CRAs to issue more conservative ratings to those firms with more asymmetric information. Conversely, everything else being equal, rating agencies might assign higher credit ratings to connected firms that can provide CRAs with soft information that reduces the level of asymmetric information.
To test our hypothesis, we examine a sample of 1,719 non-convertible public debt issues by 327 US industrial companies from 1994 to 2011. BoardEx is the source of data for connections among directors of a very large sample of US companies. To use a more precise measure of social ties, we collect information on connections between top executives and directors of the issuing companies and one of the top two CRAs in the US markets, Moody's. Moody's is a standalone company so we are able to directly identify all its directors. Further, it has full coverage in BoardEx over the entire sample period.
The other top CRA in the US market, Standard and Poor's, is a division of
McGraw-Hill. From the annual reports we are able to identify only McGraw-Hill's principal operations executives and, in particular, only the President of Standard and Poor's division. Further, only two of four identified presidents are available in BoardEx in the most recent years of our sample period. Consequently, our analysis does not consider connections between issuing firms and Standard and Poor's.
Our ordered-probit results indicate that the existence of personal connections between the rating agency and the issuing company has indeed a significant impact on the credit ratings assigned to the company's issues. In particular, we find that being personally connected increases the probability of having a better rating. This result is robust to alternative definitions of connections.
A potential issue in the interpretation of our results, as in any empirical study, is the issue of endogeneity. One potential cause of endogeneity in our study is the presence of cross-causality. This would happen, for instance, if the personal link between directors of the issuing firm and the CRA takes place after the rating. To rule out this possibility, we only include connections that are initiated before the security issue. Further, when we separate connections initiated in the past and lasting to the time of the issue (current connections) from connections initiated and terminated in the past (past connections), results are largely unchanged.
A further source of endogeneity could be that companies able to attract betterconnected managers are systematically different from those that cannot. If not properly controlled for, this factor could lead to an omitted variable bias. To address this potential concern, we take several steps. First, across all tests we include a proxy for the total connectivity of the firm. This represents the total number of connections that the directors of a certain firm have at any point in time with any other firm in the BoardEx universe. Also, we employ a propensity score matching procedure to identify identical subsamples of issues by connected and non-connected firms, based on various sets of observable company and issue characteristics. Our results still show that issues by connected firms obtain higher credit ratings than issues by (virtually indistinguishable) matched non-connected firms.
Furthermore, to stress-test the causal effect of the treatment, we perform a number of permutation tests. In the first instance, we run placebo tests to try to investigate whether firm-specific characteristics are driving the results. The treated/untreated (connected/unconnected) status is reassigned randomly across issues of treated firms. The idea is that randomly shuffling the treatment should destroy any association between the connection status and credit ratings. For robustness purposes, for each of our connection variables we implement a full Monte Carlo permutation test with 100,000 repetitions of this random shuffle. The distribution of the coefficients obtained from this repeated random shuffling approximates the distribution under the null hypothesis that there is no difference between connected and non-connected issuers. If the random coefficients are larger than the coefficients observed from our previous regressions, then we would not be able to reject the null hypothesis. Instead, our tests show that the coefficient on the randomly shuffled connection dummy exceeds the observed coefficient only in 170 cases out of 100,000 (0.17%). As a final attempt to confute our results, we perform a parallel set of permutation tests in which the treatment is randomly reassigned to issues of all firms. In this case we fail to find a single instance where the randomly shuffled coefficient is higher than the estimated parameter from the true connection status. Taken all together, these falsification tests strongly indicate that spurious correlation does not drive our previous results and, more importantly, that personal connections do indeed play an important role in determining a CRA rating.
Having established that there is a significant relation between connections and ratings, we investigate whether the (higher) credit ratings to connected companies represent a favorable treatment from the issuing company to the CRA or, rather, reflect a better flow of information. To discriminate between these two alternatives we study default rates and bond yields. First, we isolate identically rated bond issues by connected and non-connected companies. On this subset, we perform a stringent matching exercise in which we match companies based on several firm and issue characteristics and then follow these through time. The underpinning idea behind this test is that if connected firms receive ratings that are higher than they deserve (due to favorable treatment), over time these firms should exhibit higher default rates than a matched sample of non-connected firms whose rating is not affected by favoritism. The same reasoning applies to yields as we would expect the prices of these bonds to fall in time as the market receives information, through trading, on these initially 'overrated'
bonds. On the other hand, if the higher rating is the result of reduced asymmetric information between the CRA and the firm due to personal connections, then we would not expect connected firms to fare any worse in the bond market. Results from these further tests consistently show that, at the time of the issue, connected firms have equal estimated default probability (we use Altman's Z-Score) and equal bond yields to those of the non-connected companies with similar ratings in the matched sample. However, five (or ten) years after the public debt issues, we observe that connected firms display lower default rates. Further, three years after the issue connected firms have bond yields that are comparable to those of the non-connected matching sample. These tests therefore do not support the view that CRAs treat connected companies favorably.
Our results contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we contribute to the growing body of studies that show the importance of executive and directors' networks on corporate policies and decisions. Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008) study the role of personal connections between mutual fund managers and corporate board members.
They report compelling evidence that these personal connections act as an information channel between firms and investors. Engelberg, Gao, and Parson's (2012) tests strongly indicate that connected borrowers obtain loans at significantly lower interest rates when their managers have personal connections with managers of the lender. Fracassi and Tate (2012) show that the existence of personal connections between CEOs and board members significantly weakens corporate governance and negatively affects firm value. Fracassi (2012) reports that companies whose directors share a higher degree of personal connections tend to exhibit a greater similarity in their investment decisions.
We show that personal connections between executives and directors of issuing firms and CRAs result in higher ratings. This novel evidence is robust to a number of alternative tests that control for potential endogeneity and spurious correlation that could hamper the interpretation of our results.
Our paper also contributes to the growing literature that studies the determinants of the credit rating process. On one hand, Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009) refer to this process as the "alchemy" of credit ratings. Griffin and Tang (2012) provide evidence that during the financial crisis CRAs used a high degree of subjectivity in assigning ratings to collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) . Mählmann (2011) shows that the longer the relationship between the issuing firm and the rating agency, the higher the rating. Mählmann appears to rule out the hypothesis that a higher rating reflects better credit quality. Rather, the longer the relationship the stronger the incentives for the CRA to cater to client interest, leading to less accurate ratings. The results of Mathis, McAndrews, and Rochet (2009) suggest that reputation concerns are not sufficient to discipline CRAs, in particular when they rate complex products such as mortgagebacked securities and CDOs.
On the other hand, Covitz and Harrison (2003) look at the anticipation of credit rating downgrades by the bond market and find that rating changes are not driven by a favorable treatment of issuing companies; rather, they are consistent with CRAs protecting their own reputation as delegated monitors, in particular in those instances that have generated substantial publicity. Further, Gan (2004) and Butler and Cornaggia (2012) show that rating fees measure the effort CRAs exert to acquire soft information from the issuing companies and efficiently incorporate it in their (solicited) ratings. Kraft (2012) provides evidence that CRAs' adjustments for off-balance sheet debt capture relevant aspects of the credit risk of the issuing company, consistent with the argument that CRAs are indeed efficient processors of accounting information.
Our results also add to the intense debate of the last decade over the role of CRAs as efficient delegated monitors and information providers. Our study does suggest that personal connections between issuing firms and CRAs play a role in shaping their ratings. However, our tests also indicate that these connections appear to be used as a vehicle for a better flow of information and we find no evidence consistent with the presence of any kind of favorable treatment for connected issuers.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we discuss some of the key procedures in extracting the required information from various datasets and describe our sample. In section 3 we present and discuss the paper's analyses and results in detail, and explain the methodologies and statistical tools we employed. In Section 4 we summarize our main findings and conclusions.
Data and sample description

Personal connections
We gather information on personal connections from BoardEx which provides biographical information on board members and senior executives around the world.
We focus on connections between board members and senior executives of Moody's and those of public debt issuers. Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons, 2012] . In our analysis we set the Connection Dummy equal to one if the issuing company has at least one individual (either director or top executive) personally connected to another individual (either director or top executive) in the CRA at the same time of the debt issue. When we define the Connection Dummy we take into account both current and past connections as described above. For instance, for a company that issues a bond in 1999, an educational connection between a top executive of the company and a director of the rating agency dating back to 1980s is categorized as past;
whereas the connection between two top executives sitting together on the board of a third company from 1994 to 2001 is considered as current.
As an alternative, we also use the natural logarithm of the total number of connections between issuing firms and Moody's. Further, we construct a measure of the total connectivity of the issuing company as the total number of connections between the individuals (managers or directors) of the issuing firm and all other individuals covered in BoardEx (Ln 1+No. of Connected Individuals). This captures the overall degree of connectivity of the issuing firm.
Debt issues
We use the Securities Data Company (SDC) Platinum Database to gather information on securities issuances, including credit rating, issue date, maturity, and seniority, among others. SDC also provides information on the S-3 form filing date and SEC filing number that we use to identify the solicited ratings. 6 We focus on public non-convertible debt issues, as their characteristics differ significantly from convertible bonds and other types of debt obligations. Financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) and regulated utility companies (SIC 4909-4939) are also excluded from the analysis as these firms are subject to different rating standards. Our tests include only rated issues. We convert the ratings into numerical values in descending order in line with the literature, with number 17 representing the highest rating and number 1 representing the lowest rating category.
Data on solicitation come from the SEC's EDGAR (Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval) database. Prior to September 2007 rating agencies were not required to report whether (domestic) ratings were solicited or not. Therefore we use the registration statements available online. Many of these registration statements are filed using the S-3 form, which contains information on the rating agency fees. We follow the procedure of several previous studies including Butler and Cornaggia (2012) and Gan (2004) , to distinguish solicited from unsolicited ratings. Companies report estimated rating agency fees based on the total issue amount and the number of paid (solicited) ratings. We define an issue as "unsolicited" if the rating agency fees are zero or not reported and as "solicited" if the estimated rating agency fees are sufficient to cover the fees for all the agencies involved. 
Univariate analysis
In Table 1 we present descriptive statistics of the connection variables. The first set of variables are dummies that take a value of one if there exists a connection of a specific kind between the rating agency and the issuer, and zero otherwise; the second set of variables represents the number of existing connections. Among connected firms, Past Connections are more common than Current Connections (about 77% of connections come from a past link between directors of the issuing firm and Moody's).
As expected, Professional Connections are the most common source of connections, followed by Educational Connections. Unreported tests show that connected companies do not appear to be clustered into specific industries. Table 1 here
In Table 2 we provide summary statistics of issue (Panel A) and firm characteristics (Panel B) for the full sample and also for connected and non-connected firms separately. Average rating is about 10 (this corresponds to a Baa1 in Moody's scale), which is in line with previous studies. For instance, Hovakimian, Kayhan, and
Titman (2012) report an average rating of 10. Panel A reveals that connected issuers obtain significantly higher credit ratings. We find no sizeable difference in solicitation of ratings between connected and non-connected issuers. Both groups appear to pay for their ratings about 60% of the time. The percentage of defaults is also significantly lower in the connected group. Non-connected issuers (Panel B) have higher book-tomarket ratios and operating margins, but are generally smaller and riskier (e.g. higher interest coverage ratio) and have lower profitability than connected issuers. Also, connected issuers generally have more connections to other individuals or organizations than do non-connected issuers. Table 2 here Figure 1 we plot the average ratings over time. The plot shows how there seems to be a persistent difference in average ratings between connected and nonconnected issuers in each year of our sample period. We also observe a general decline in the quality of credit ratings. Similar figures are reported by Hovakimian, Kayhan, and Titman (2012) for Standard and Poor's. 7 We complement their evidence by showing that the decrease in ratings is particularly severe in the post financial crisis period. More importantly, while the decreasing trend applies to all firms, non-connected issuers appear to be much more severely hit than connected ones.
Personal connections and credit ratings: regression results
In line with the literature in this field, we employ ordered-probit models to estimate the determinants of credit ratings. The ratings are ordered partitions of an unobservable continuous variable, which is a linear function of the explanatory variables. The model can be expressed as follows:
( 1) where is the unobserved linking variable; is the variable of interest, which is a dummy equal to one if the debt issue i is of a company with at least one director personally connected with a director of the credit agency and zero otherwise;
is a vector of both issue and company characteristics; is a mean-zero normal random error representing the unobservable factors affecting the rating;
are the threshold parameters and is the observed rating category assigned to issue i. To reduce the possibility of spurious correlation, in our regression tests we include several issue and firm characteristics. In addition, we control for the solicitation status of the issues, and the overall connectivity of the firm. Also included are dummy variables indicating the year of the issue and the industry the company operates in, to control for systematic differences in credit rating standards across years and industries.
The estimated coefficients from the ordered-probit tests are presented in Table 3 (Panels A and B). The results across all specifications suggest that personal connections do indeed play an important role in determining the credit ratings: connected issues are more likely to obtain higher credit ratings than non-connected ones.
- Table 3 here
As we discussed above, one possible concern is that the CRA-issuer connection effect might be affected by the overall connectivity of the firm. In other words, the rating agency might assign higher ratings to issues of better-connected companies as these companies could exploit their connections to other companies (e.g., bank officials) in turbulent times, to avoid default. For instance, Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons (2012) find that borrowers whose directors are connected to directors of the lender obtain loans at lower interest rates. To alleviate this concern, we always include a proxy for the overall connectivity of the issuing firm. (Controlling for this factor does not seem to affect our main results.) The coefficient of Connection Dummy in model I is positive and statistically significant but we fail to detect a statistically significant effect of the overall connectivity of the firm on its credit rating across all models. In models II and III we split current and past connections while in model IV we split connections according to their origination (professional, educational or army). The results show that both current and past connections play a significant role in determining the credit ratings, although past connections show a slightly stronger effect. 8 With regards to the origination of the connection, all types of connection (professional, education and army) have a positive effect on ratings.
In Table 3 Panel B we replicate the above tests on the natural logarithm of the total number of existing connections (plus one) rather than the connection dummies (Ln 
Endogeneity concerns
As with any empirical study in our field, a caveat in the interpretation of our results is the issue of endogeneity. We believe this problem is less of a concern in our exercise for two reasons. First, similar to Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons (2012), our connections pre-date the debt issues. Second, for unsolicited ratings it is the CRA's decision to rate firms, not a firm's decision. When the company solicits the rating, we control for this in our tests. This leaves little room for self-selection problems.
Furthermore, our descriptive statistics show virtually no difference in solicitation of ratings between the two groups.
Nonetheless, a potential reason for concern could be that companies with connected managers are systematically different from companies with non-connected managers. Our descriptive statistics in Table 1 partly corroborate this view although we do control for all these issue and firm characteristics in all models. Nonetheless, we use several tests to minimize this potential concern.
Propensity score matching
We first employ a propensity score matching procedure, as in Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) , to identify a control sample of issues by non-connected firms that exhibit no observable differences in characteristics relative to issues by firms run by connected managers. Thus, the control and treated firms are restricted to a set of peers that are virtually indistinguishable except for one key characteristic: the connection between managers and directors of the issuing firm and Moody's. 9 This procedure provides a more reliable test of the impact of the treatment (i.e. the connection to the CRA) on the outcome variable, credit ratings.
In Table 4 we present the propensity score matching results. 10 To ensure the issues in the control sample are sufficiently similar to the issues with connected 9 See Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) , Rubin and Thomas (1997) for further discussion of propensity score matching. 10 The propensity score matching method is implemented using the PSMATCH2 package in STATA [Leuven and Sianesi, 2003 ]. In unreported tests we replicate the matching analysis using the nearest neighbour matching method, by Abadie, Drukker, Leber Herr, and Imbens (2009 
-----------------------------------------------------------
Please insert Table 4 here
Falsification tests
To ensure that our results do not capture spurious correlation and to further strengthen our causal interpretation of the treatment, we run two different types of falsification tests. One first concern with our previous tests could be that the results are driven by an unobservable firm-specific characteristic. For instance, there could be an unobservable characteristic that drives both the ratings and the ability of an issuer to attract connected managers. To try to confute this alternative interpretation of our results, we perform permutation tests for all the treatment (connection) variables. We randomly shuffle the treatment variable (connection status) across the subsample of firms that have at least one treated issue. If our results are mainly driven by firmspecific unobservable characteristics, then we should still find a positive and significant association between this placebo treatment and ratings. On the other hand, if the higher rating is due to the presence of a real connection, then the reshuffling effectively discards any possible association between the connection status and the credit rating.
The distribution of the coefficients obtained from this repeated random shuffling approximates the distribution under the null hypothesis that there is no difference between connected and non-connected issuers, or, in other words, there is no link between treatment (connection) and outcome (credit rating). Then we would expect to find no association between this placebo treatment and credit ratings.
To draw statistically robust conclusions on this type of analysis, we perform a full Monte Carlo permutation test. That is, we perform 100,000 repetitions of the above exercise where the connection status is randomly reassigned across issues of connected firms. We then compare the coefficient from the true connection variable with this distribution of randomly shuffled coefficients obtained under the null hypothesis. If the coefficients from the shuffled variable are larger than the estimated coefficient from our previous regressions, then we would not be able to reject the null hypothesis. We report the results from these tests in Table 5 -
-------------------------------------------------
Please insert Table 5 here
We perform an additional falsification test (Table 5 Panel B) in which we allow the treatment to be randomly reassigned to any issue of any company in the dataset. In this way we can more broadly test whether our results are driven by some sort of spurious correlation. Similarly to the previous exercise, we find no case where the effect of the placebo appears to be stronger than the effect of the treatment, except with the Current Connection Dummy (110 cases; implied p-value 0.001). Altogether the falsification tests indicate that the (causal) effect we find between the existence of personal connections and credit ratings is not spurious and is not driven by other unobservable firm characteristics, since randomly assigning connections to the same set of companies does not yield significant results. This further corroborates our previous evidence that personal connections between CRA directors and executives and issuing company directors and executives is an important determinant of credit rating.
Results discussion
Credibility is a credit rating agency's most valuable asset, and it is hard to believe that credit rating agencies are willing to put this at risk. During an investor conference, Raymond McDaniel, CEO of Moody's, was reported as stating: "We are in a business where reputational capital is more important" (Pittman, 2008) . First, we study post-issue default rates. We match issues on the basis of credit rating, Z-Scores, overall connectivity, solicitation, maturity, issue amount, issue years and industry using the propensity score technique. The basic intuition is that if the connected issue had received an "artificially high" rating due to favorable treatment by Moody's, this would be more likely to default than an identical non-connected issue that did not receive any favorable treatment (and which was rated equally). If, however, the higher rating is driven by availability of and reliance on soft information, the connected issues' default rates should not be higher than those of non-connected issues. The results presented in Table 6 strongly suggest that connected issues display significantly lower default rates within a five-or ten-year horizon than a set of virtually identical nonconnected ones. This evidence is strongly at odds with the notion that the CRA assigns, at the expense of their own reputation, artificially higher ratings to issues by companies with which its directors have personal connections.
--------------------------------------------------
Please insert Table 6 here
To further distinguish between the favorable treatment and flow of information hypotheses, we analyze bond yields as a market-based measure of company (bond) performance. If market efficiency holds, and connected issuers receive artificially higher ratings due to favorable treatment, we expect bond prices, and hence yields, to adjust over time as more information becomes available to the market. In particular, we should observe higher bond yields (lower prices) for connected issuers than nonconnected issuers with identical ratings several years after the issue. In contrast, if connections act as an informal information channel between issuers and the CRA, we
should not observe such a stronger increase in yield across the connected group.
In Table 7 we present the differences between bond yields for connected and non-connected subsamples of companies rated by Moody's, both at the time of issue and three years after issue. 12 The issues are matched using propensity score matching based on credit rating, overall connectivity, solicitation, maturity, issue amount, issue years and industries. Bonds issued by connected and non-connected companies have very similar yields at the time of issue. When we compare the yields three years after the issue, we fail to detect any significant difference between connected and non-connected firms. If the rating assigned to the connected firm had been driven by a favorable treatment of the issuer, in time the negative information "disguised" in the artificially higher rating would be revealed to the market and would be incorporated into the price of the bond. This, in turn, would result in significantly higher yields for connected firms. If anything we find a slightly higher yield for unconnected issues, which suggests that their bond prices have decreased proportionally more in time.
- Table 7 here
These results appear to rule out the favorable treatment hypothesis and provide further strong evidence in support of the better information hypothesis. In other words, they indicate that credit rating agencies assign higher ratings to issuers that are connected to them through personal relationships, not as a favor but because they face lower asymmetric information. These connections appear to provide better access to soft information, and allow CRAs to better rely on this information when assessing the creditworthiness of the obligations.
Conclusions
We study whether connections between credit rating agencies and issuing companies at director or top executive level play any role in the determination of ratings. Our tests indicate that personal connections between issuers and rating agencies have a positive effect on credit ratings. Our results also indicate that connections with different time frames (current and past) as well as connections with different origins (professional and army mostly) have a positive impact on assigned credit ratings.
We control for possible endogeneity using propensity score tests and placebo falsification tests. All the results corroborate our previous findings on the effect of each class of connections on credit ratings. Connected issues on average obtain higher credit ratings of about half a notch for past connections and more than one notch when the connection is still ongoing.
We also test whether these connections act as informal information channels that allow CRAs to better assess the rating of firms or whether connections are an alternative mechanism for CRAs to favor connected issuers. Our tests on default rates and bond yields all suggest that the higher ratings of connected companies are due to lower degrees of asymmetric information and uncertainty, availability of better and more information through the information channels, and stronger reliance on soft rather than hard information. confirmed that S&P's ratings -whether of corporate debt, municipal bonds, structured finance, or the like -have been highly effective in informing the markets about both deterioration and improvement in credit quality.
[…] There is no evidence of any misconduct by our analysts or that the fundamental integrity of our ratings process has been compromised. Indeed, the SEC itself concluded that it found no evidence during its examination that S&P had compromised its standards to please issuers. It is also worth repeating that no single analyst, including the authors of these emails, has the ability to determine ratings on his or her own as all of our ratings are determined by
Concerns about potential conflict of interests between issuing firms and CRAs and, more generally, about a lack of understanding of the rating process CRAs employ, have been raised by regulators during the Enron scandal (SEC, 2003) and in the more recent financial crisis (SEC, 2008) . Our results showing that connected issuers receive, on average, higher ratings may cast doubt over the quality of these ratings. Nonetheless, we find no evidence that the higher rating of connected firms is undeserved. On the contrary, our tests indicate that personal connections appear to act as an informal information channel through which asymmetric information between the issuing firm and the CRA can be reduced. In this table, for each issue by a company connected to Moody's through its executives and/or directors, we identify a control issue by a company that is not connected to Moody's. We use a propensity score matching procedure. The propensity score is estimated using all firm and issue characteristics included in our regression analyses, as well as year and industry dummies. We require that the difference between the propensity score of the connected firm and its matching peer does not exceed 1% in absolute value. We then compare the average Moody's credit rating between connected and non-connected companies at the time of issue. Moody's Rating is the numerical conversion of the rating assigned by Moody's in descending order, with number 17 representing the highest rating (Aaa) and number 1 representing the lowest rating category (Caa, Caa1 & Caa2) . We also report the difference in credit rating means across the two groups, as well as the p-value of the significance of the difference and the p-value of the propensity score. Table 6 . Default rate analysis
In this table, for each issuing company connected to Moody's through its executives and/or directors, we identify a control firm that is not connected to Moody's. We use a propensity score matching procedure. The propensity score is estimated using Moody's credit rating, Z-Score, overall connectivity, and all issue characteristics included in our regression analyses (Solicitation, Issue Amount, Maturity and Seniority), as well as year and industry dummies. We require that the difference between the propensity score of the connected firm and its matching peer does not exceed 1% in absolute value. We then compare the average default rate of firms in five years (Panel A) and ten years (Panel B) after the issue respectively. We report also the difference in default rate means across the two groups, as well as the p-value of the significance of the difference and the p-value of the propensity score. Table 7 . Bond yield analysis
Panel A. Default in five years
Matched
In this table, for each issue by a company connected to Moody's through its executives and/or directors, we identify a control issue by a firm that is not connected to Moody's. We use a propensity score matching procedure. The propensity score is estimated using Moody's credit rating, overall connectivity, and all issue characteristics included in our regression analyses (Solicitation, Issue Amount, Maturity and Seniority), as well as year and industry dummies. We require that the difference between the propensity score of the connected firm and its matching peer does not exceed 1% in absolute value. We then compare the average bond yields of firms at the time of the issue and three years after the issue. We report also the difference in bond yield means across the two groups, as well as the p-value of the significance of the difference and the p-value of the propensity score. As most bonds are not traded on a daily basis, we compute the three-years-yield as the average yield in a [-45,+45] 
